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Abstract
Since Boorse (1977) published his paper “Health as a theoretical con-
cept” one of the most lively debates within philosophy of medicine has
been on the question of whether health and disease are in some sense
‘objective’ and ‘value-free’ or ‘subjective’ and ‘value-laden’. Due to
the apparent ‘failure’ of pure naturalist, constructivist, or normativist
accounts, much in the recent literature has appealed to more concilia-
tory approaches or so-called ‘hybrid accounts’ of health and disease. A
recent paper by Matthewson and Griffiths (2017), however, may bear
the seeds for the revival of purely naturalist approach to health and
disease. In this paper, I defend their idea of Biological Normativity
against recent criticism by Schwartz (2017) and hope to help it flower
into a revival of naturalist approaches in the philosophy of medicine.
Keywords: biological normativity; Boorse; Wakefield; health; disease; nat-
uralism
Index
1 Introduction 2
2 Internal Turmoil in the Naturalist Camp 5
3 Can there be a Naturalist Normativity? 8
3.1 Four Objective Failures in Biological Normativity . . . . . . . 10
3.2 What about Humans? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4 Biological Normativity Defended 15
5 Naturalism Strikes Back 18
1
1 Introduction
Since Christopher Boorse (1977) published his paper “Health as a theoret-
ical concept” one of the most lively debates within philosophy of medicine
has been on the question of whether health and disease are in some sense
‘objective’ and ‘value-free’ or ‘subjective’ and ‘value-laden’. The conflict is
often expressed with a famous quote by the Welsh psychiatrist Robert Evan
Kendell who argued that the dispute is the most central and contentious
issue in the medical sciences:
The most fundamental issue, and also the most contentious one, is
whether disease and illness are normative concepts based on value
judgments, or whether they are value free scientific terms; in other
words, whether they are biomedical terms or sociopolitical ones.
– Robert E. Kendell (1986, p. 25)
In line with this, two opposed sets of accounts of health and disease have
been distinguished in the literature. On the one hand, there are natural-
ist accounts of health and disease characterized as being objective, based in
science and value-free. On the other there are normativist or social construc-
tivist accounts, that recognize the role of values and social facts, although the
differences among these can vary as widely as their differences to naturalist
accounts.
However, far from being universally accepted, naturalist accounts of
health and disease - such as Boorse’s (1977) so-called ‘biostatistical account’
(often abbreviated as BST) - have been considered rather unsuccessful in
dealing with the accumulating criticism from so-called normativists (for a
summary of these criticisms see Kingma 2017). Though normativist accounts
of health and disease are far from uniform, they have gained substantial
traction within the literature (see Goosens 1980; Reznek 1987; Cooper 2002;
Nordenfelt 1993, 1995; Kukla 2014). In the naturalist tradition, health has
often been equated with the absence of disease. However health, unlike
disease, is taken by many - especially in the various anti-naturalist traditions
- to be a much more straightforward case for normativism, something that
just intuitively goes over and beyond the mere absence of disease. In fact,
the very definition of health by the World Health Organization suggests that
while disease might be a naturalist concept, health requires further facts: “a
state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the
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absence of disease”.1 Boorse (1975) argued early on that this discrepancy is
based on two distinct senses of health, one of which is naturalist and opposed
to disease, and one that is normative and opposed to illness.2
This divide and conquer strategy of naturalists, however, has not yielded
great acceptance.3 Instead, naturalist approaches to health and disease ap-
pear to have become less and less popular over time. This is largely due the
abundance of criticism Boorse’s BST account has encountered - an account
that is considered by many to be the “best and only presently existing natu-
ralistic account” (Kingma 2010, p. 262). It is thus not at all surprising that
with an accumulation of more and more critiques published against the BST
account, that the viability of naturalism appears to have evaporated in the
eyes of observers and participants of the debate.
But as John Matthewson and Paul Griffiths (2017) point out in an
excellent paper, this dismissal of naturalism is premature. After all, there
is a second group of naturalist accounts of health and disease not linked to
statistical normality but to the proper functions or selected effects literature
in philosophy of biology (see Millikan 1984; Neander 1983). In these types of
accounts, a “dysfunction occurs when a part or process fails to produce the
effect that led to the evolution of that part or process by natural selection”
(Matthewson and Griffiths 2017, 450). Such etiological accounts of functions
based on evolutionary history are popular among philosophers of biology and
have recently been defended as a superior alternative to the BST (see Griffiths
and Matthewson 2018). Though it is Jerome Wakefield (1992, 1999, 2000,
2001, 2007) who is most often associated with this view within the philosophy
of medicine, Karen Neander (1983) was been an earlier defender of the view
- exploring it in her PhD thesis.4
As the literature stands, neither of these types of accounts has been
1See the Preamble of World Health Organization 2020.
2Though he appears to have changed his mind on this in later publications (Boorse
1997, 2014).
3Though some bioethicist influenced by naturalism have suggested that the concept of
health has no intrinsic relevance for ethics over and beyond its relationship to wellbeing
(Savulescu et al. 2011; Veit 2018b,a,c), thus suggesting that the ‘normativist’ concern may
simply be accommodated by switching to considerations of welfare.
4As she met an unfortunate demise due to a lengthy struggle with cancer in May 2020,
I very much dedicate this paper to her and her project for the naturalization of norms. I
encourage a reading of Hill and Pavese (2020) for a tribute to and excellent overview of
Neander and her work.
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widely accepted.5 Nevertheless, both have raised an array of criticisms. As
Matthewson and Griffiths argue: “[b]oth accounts have been inundated by
counterexamples, many of which appear to show that they are too restric-
tive: that they exclude genuine cases of disease” (2017, p. 450). Though
both Boorse (1997, 2014) and Wakefield (2000, 2007) have responded to
these sorts of criticisms and proposed more sophisticated versions of their
accounts, Matthewson and Griffiths are under the impression that this has
“led a number of authors to suggest that no adequate objective account of
disease is in the offing, and to favour views that place more emphasis on
social facts”, something they think should be avoided as it would lead to
a “conceptual divorce of human disease and pathology as a biological phe-
nomenon” (2017, 451). Naturally, this is a development that erodes the very
core of naturalism.
Partially, this is already apparent in the work of Wakefield, who en-
dorses a hybrid account between an objective dysfunction criterion and an
evaluative criterion and is thus considered by many to not actually be a natu-
ralist. However, both Wakefield’s and Boorse’s accounts require the presence
of dysfunction as an objective biological criterion for disease - something the
literature is moving away from. Matthewson and Griffiths (2017) attempt to
remedy the opposition to naturalism by introducing what they call Biological
Normativity, a concept that they argue is better able to capture the myriad
ways things can objectively go wrong in the biological world, without any
reference to a human observer or their values. I think that this concept holds
even greater potential for the debate than either of them realized. It is thus
my aim in this paper to defend their idea of Biological Normativity against
recent criticism by Schwartz (2017) and to help it flourish into a genuine new
hope for naturalism.
Having motivated the goal of this paper, let us now offer a brief outline
of how this paper is going to be structured. In Section 2, I begin by
sketching the two most influential dysfunction-based accounts of health and
disease popularized by Boorse (1977) and Wakefield (1992) respectively, and
illustrate the criticisms they have received. In Section 3, I analyse and
ameliorate Matthewson’s and Griffiths’ concept of Biological Normativity,
before I defend the idea from a number of criticisms raised by Schwartz
(2017) in Section 4. Finally, I take a broader perspective in Section 5
5In Veit (forthcominga), I have argued that experimental philosophy may be usefully
applied to solve this debate.
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and discuss the idea of Biological Normativity as a way to bridge the gap
between naturalists and normativists, thus offering an important role for
naturalist philosophy of medicine in the field.
2 Internal Turmoil in the Naturalist Camp
While health in the naturalist picture is often the mere absence of disease,
most naturalists define disease in terms of dysfunctional states. However,
just as the philosophical literature on health and disease is roughly split into
two opposing camps, i.e. naturalists and normativists,6 naturalist accounts
of disease can be sorted into two different sub-camps, themselves tied to
two different views on what counts as dysfunctional. The first account, as
previously mentioned, is the biostatistical account of disease (BST) provided
by Boorse (1977), in what is perhaps the most cited and influential paper in
the philosophy of medicine literature. Boorsian-type accounts are tied to the
concept of fitness and define health as statistically species-typical functioning
within a reference class, e.g. age and gender. This account is over 40 years old
and has recently been slightly updated by Boorse (2014) in order to respond
to his critics:
Boorse’s most recent version of the BST
1. The reference class is a natural class of organisms of uniform
functional design; specifically, an age group of a sex of a
species.
2. A normal function of a part or process within members of
the reference class is a statistically typical contribution by
it to their individual survival [or] reproduction.
3. Health in a member of the reference class is normal func-
tional ability : the readiness of each internal part to perform
all its normal functions on typical occasions with at least
typical efficiency.
4. A disease [later, pathological condition] is a type of internal
state which impairs health, i.e., reduces one or more func-
tional abilities below typical efficiency.
6Though I prefer the label anti-naturalists for the latter group.
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– Adapted from Christopher Boorse (2014, p. 684 and 1977, p.
562).
Despite refinements by authors such as Peter Schwartz (2007b) and Dan
Hausman (2012) the BST account can easily be misinterpreted as a widely
accepted view within the field. Most of its citations, however, are from
critical pieces rather than endorsements or applications of the view. Im-
portantly, criticism directed against the BST account does not only come
from the normativist side, something that gets lost in the naive picture that
is sometimes propagated, in which the BST is the only possible naturalist
account. Griffiths and Matthewson (2018) speculate that the reasons for
Kingma’s assertion lie in Wakefield’s desire to defend the harmful dysfunc-
tion account as a hybrid one - one that is not purely based on biological facts.
As a result, Kingma ‘praises’ the BST as previously illustrated as “the best
and only presently existing naturalistic account”, all the while criticizing it
as being “inadequate, both as a naturalistic account of dysfunction and as a
naturalistic account of disease” (Kingma 2010, 22). This view appears to be
all too widely accepted and yet, there are two major problems with it, since
it i) suggests that naturalist goals have no role to play once values enter the
picture, and ii) that there can only be one naturalist account. One or the
other has to give.
But this may be premature. Let us therefore take a closer look at
Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction account. According to Wakefield, his harm-
ful dysfunction account for mental disorders is a hybrid account between
normativism and naturalism. Not only need a dysfunction be present in a
patient, but it must also be considered harmful in order to qualify as a disease
state:
Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction account (HD)
In order for a condition to qualify as a (mental) disease, the fol-
lowing two requirements need to be met. The (mental) disease
condition needs to be both:
1. a failure of biologically designed functioning
2. and judged negative by sociocultural standards (Wakefield
2007, p. 149)
– Adapted from Jerome Wakefield (2007, p. 149)
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Though originally intended as a theoretical account of mental disorders Wake-
field’s harmful dysfunction account can easily be extended to all diseases
(something he is not opposed to). It is therefore unclear why Kingma (2010)
excludes it in her dismissal of naturalistic accounts of health and disease,
since Boorse’s account is clearly neither the only nor best available account.
Boorse (2014) himself suggests that one may simply switch the function com-
ponent in his account for a superior one, so it seems clear that both views
on function present alternative naturalist approaches to health and disease.
A third possible way has recently been suggested in the application of ‘or-
ganizational functions’ to health and disease (Saborido and Moreno 2015;
Saborido et al. 2016). These approaches are interesting and deserve further
attention, yet go beyond the scope of this article. If they succeed, how-
ever, the arguments in this paper will only be strengthened. Though both of
these types of accounts have often been viewed as mutually exclusive, with
most naturalists of health and disease falling into one of these two camps,
Matthewson and Griffiths (2017) argue that this conclusion may have been
drawn prematurely. In fact, an obvious alternative might be available, i.e.
roughly a merger of the two types of accounts, able to accommodate the
counterexamples brought forth against each.
Matthewson and Griffiths (2017) list the following counterexamples to
each account they deem to be the most severe. Firstly, they point out that
the BST fails to classify diseases when they are epidemic and persist for
generations, e.g. lice, which are common not only in animals but at least un-
til very recently among humans. From an evolutionary biology perspective,
it is uncontested that an organism that is parasitized should be considered
diseased or at least in a pathological state (if one wants to avoid the phe-
nomenological association with diseases), even if the parasite has infected the
entire population and has done so for a generation.
Secondly, but relatedly, Wakefield (2000) urges us to consider infections
that protect against later illnesses and hence would not qualify as a disease
under the fitness-based BST account. The selected effect view of functions
helps to accommodate both of these cases, but Wakefield’s account faces its
own criticism. Matthewson and Griffiths list vestigial organs that by defi-
nition cannot be considered dysfunctional, but clearly pose problems to an
organism. After all, the “failure to perform certain abilities that are cur-
rently common in the population [but] might seem detrimental in medically
relevant ways, regardless of selective history” (2017, 451). One such exam-
ple is reading, a trait that is too recent to have been selected for, but may
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nevertheless be considered dysfunctional if failing, i.e. dyslexia (see Murphy
and Woolfolk 2000; Kingma 2013 and for further criticism and Griffiths and
Matthewson 2018 for a defence of the selected effect view in medicine). As
these examples elegantly show, both supposedly conflicting accounts might
solve each other’s problems and open the path to a superior naturalist ac-
count of health and disease when combined in a unified picture of what can
go wrong in the biological world. In the following, I shall, therefore, offer
a brief analysis of Matthewson’s and Griffiths’ idea of biological normativity
and defend their view against recent criticism.
3 Can there be a Naturalist Normativity?
The philosophical debate on whether health and disease can be naturalized
often focuses on the role these concepts play within the manifest image. If
someone goes to the doctor to treat an ‘ill’, they don’t need to have any ob-
jective knowledge of their biology. Rather, illness as it is understood among
the public involves a kind of internal perspective - often a kind of suffering or
obstacle to pursue one’s goals that causes one to seek out a remedy. These
facts have been highlighted by phenomenologists such as Havi Carel (2007,
2011, 2018) to argue for the inadequacy of naturalism. This point, however,
has already been made by the French historian and philosopher of medicine
Georges Canguilhem:
Disease is behavior of negative value for a concrete individual liv-
ing being in a relation of polarized activity with his environment.
In this sense, it is not only for man - although the terms patholog-
ical or malady, through their relation to pathos or mal, indicate
that these notions are applied to all living beings through sympa-
thetic regression starting from lived human experience - but for
every living thing that there is only completely organic disease.
There are diseases of the dog and the bee.
– Georges Canguilhem (1991, p. 226)
Indeed, Canguilhem not only anticipated phenonomenological approaches to
health and disease, but he also introduced the term ‘Biological Normativ-
ity’. It is thus surprising that Matthewson and Griffiths don’t make any
reference in their paper to the fact that Canguilhem introduced the term
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first, despite the fact that he is mentioned at multiple times throughout
their paper.7 This would be justified if not for the fact that they intend the
term to mean something entirely different from Canguilhem. Indeed, their
argument seems to be set up entirely against Canguilhem’s notion that our
judgements of whether plants or other animals are diseased are merely based
on a sympathetic regression from the human experience of suffering, illness,
and disease.8
The philosophical debate on the status of health and disease is in many
ways a muddled debate, bordering on many old and familiar philosophical
problems. To make progress, it is helpful to bracket one of these problems off.
The question Matthewson and Griffiths (2017) appear to be concerned with
is whether there is anything objective to say about health and disease. One
could take on board almost all the arguments of ‘anti-naturalists’ and yet
it would not be clear for many of them what their answer to the following
question would be: Is there anything that could be objectively considered
pathological in the biological world? Canguilhem emphatically denied that
this is possible:
There is no objective pathology. Structures or behaviors can be
objectively described but they cannot be called “pathological” on
the strength of some purely objective criterion. Objectively, only
varieties or differences can be defined with positive or negative
vital values.
– Georges Canguilhem (1991, p. 226)
This statement, however, is just plain wrong upon an examination of evolu-
tionary biology in which normative language is simply abundant.9 It thus
7Canguilhem’s fate in the philosophy of medicine is in many ways an unfortunate one,
since many of its current debates have already been discussed by Canguilhem and I may
add in a better form than today. Unlike other glorified spearheads for new philosophical
disciplines such as David Hull in the philosophy of biology or Daniel Hausman in the
philosophy of economics, Canguilhem appears to be continuously underappreciated - a
fate that is probably owed to his placement in the continental tradition.
8Recently, philosophers have argued that we can and should explicitly explore the
phenomenology or subjective experience of health and suffering in non-human animals
which gets us somewhat closer to Canguilhem’s aspirations yet remains fairly within a
naturalist framework (see Browning 2020b,a, 2019a,b,c, 2018; Browning and Veit 2020;
Veit and Browning forthcoming).
9See for instance Millikan (1984, 1989, 1995); Veit (2019a).
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appears as if Matthewson and Griffiths use the term Biological Normativity
for a dual role: to i) turn Canguilhem’s picture on its head, and ii) cause
a rift in the naturalist/normativist divide in the philosophy of medicine by
appealing to a naturalist kind of normativity. Giving up naturalism is a con-
clusion Matthewson and Griffiths (2017) intended to avoid. In this paper,
I argue that their arguments for a objective form of biological normativity
have even greater potential than they themselves intended, offering an oppor-
tunity to bridge the gap between naturalists and normativists and eventually
solving the needlessly hostile debate between the two groups. Importantly,
Matthewson and Griffiths are not arguing that their criterion is “sufficient
for disease to occur; just that disease cannot be solely a matter of social
convention” (2017, p. 464). As such they are not denying that social facts
or human values could play a role in defining health and disease and hence
are somewhat at odds with the traditional definition of naturalist accounts
being value-free. Nevertheless, the role they attribute to values is a minor
one. Instead, they press their account on “the fact that notions of normality,
abnormality, pathology, and physiology are essential to understanding the
biology of living things, even in cases where human values play no role what-
soever” (2017, p. 464). Intended to convince normativists, they develop their
concept of biological normativity (BN), a failure of which could be counted
as pathological. In the following, I explain their four ways of going wrong
that jointly constitute BN.
3.1 Four Objective Failures in Biological Normativity
The first way they suggest in which something can go wrong for an organism
is mechanism failure. They illustrate this idea by describing the mutated
db/db mouse, which is a strain of mouse with faulty receptors for the hor-
mone leptin. One of the primary functions of leptin is the control of hunger,
which leads this strain into a dysfunctional state of obesity. They argue
that one can justifiably make an evaluative or normative judgement here:
“[s]omething has gone wrong for these mice—they are not the way they
ought to be” (2017, p. 453). In their first case of going wrong, this ‘some-
thing’ is simple to understand: it is the failure of a mechanism. They grant
that this first way of going wrong is similar to ‘selected effect’ accounts of
function (see Godfrey-Smith 1994; Neander 1983, 1991), where a “biological
structure fails to perform its function if it is unable to fulfil the causal role
for which it has been selected in the recent evolutionary past” (2017, p. 453)
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but prefer the term mechanism failure in order to distinguish it from other
kinds of dysfunction. In doing so, they expose their preference for Wakefield-
type accounts of dysfunction in medicine. In fact, both have authored an
additional paper (see Griffiths and Matthewson 2018) in which they made a
similar argument in favour of naturalism, arguing that the failure of the BST
should not be equated with a failure of naturalism. Rather than combining
the HD account with the BST, they argued that the selected effects account
is the superior one. In Matthewson and Griffiths (2017) they take a more
permissive view, as we shall see with the following three additional ways in
which something can go wrong for an organism.
The second way in which something can go wrong for an organism is an
“abNormal environment” (2017, p. 454), an idea they borrow from Millikan
(1984). They describe the situation where a “mechanism is operating in
accordance with its design but outside the operating parameters for that
design” (2017, p. 454), suggesting the example of male glow-worms that fail
to find mates in human settlements with high light pollution, an environment
their mate-finding mechanism was not designed for.
These two ways of going wrong are tied to evolutionary history, the
first source of normativity within biology. When biologists speak of natural
design they are referring to the historical pressures of natural selection that
have led to the adaptedness of traits, giving rise to proper functions, so named
by Millikan (1984). However, Matthewson and Griffiths (2017) argue that
there is at least one more such source.
The second source of normativity within biology is tied to the concept
of fitness. They invite us to imagine the common monkey flower (Mimu-
lus guttatus) growing in an inhospitable environment, flowering earlier and
producing fewer seeds, then more fortunate conspecifics in order to ensure
reproduction. However, the flower is doing exactly as designed, and the en-
vironment is not an abNormal one. Hence, they argue that an inhospitable
environment is the third way in which something can go wrong for an organ-
ism.
The final way Matthewson and Griffiths (2017, p. 456) discuss in which
something can go wrong for an organism is a heuristic failure. They discuss
the example of the water flea (Daphnia cucullata) equipped with a develop-
ment switch. Depending on the frequency of predators faced by a mother
flea, her offspring will be born with defence mechanisms, such as spikes.
However, these defence mechanisms are costly and from a fitness perspective
should not be produced if the number of predators in their habitat is going
11
to be low. Such developmental switches or heuristics, therefore, generate a
fourth way in which something can go wrong, i.e. the failure of the heuristic
to select the appropriate phenotype. In order to distinguish between the
third and fourth way, they draw a distinction between realized and expected
fitness maximization. In the case of the common monkey flower, realized
fitness is maximized, even though conspecifics on a more hospitable ground
have higher fitness. If the density of predators fluctuates, perhaps, due to
external circumstances, realized fitness is not maximized when the inappro-
priate phenotype has been selected. However, given the available information
expected fitness may nevertheless be maximized. To emphasize that these
failures in biological normativity are not uncommon they point out that hu-
mans born in cold climates develop fewer sweat glands, something that can
have a detrimental effect on them if they move to warmer climates. They
argue that “in these cases and many others, a ‘good bet’ was made, given the
information available, but it nevertheless turned out to be the wrong option”
(2017, p. 457).
After arguing for these four distinct ways in which biological science
seems to legitimize judgements that something has gone wrong with an organ-
ism, they make the elegant move to introduce humans back into the picture.
Whereas pathology judgements in the case of humans evoke much stronger
normativist intuitions, other organisms such as plants seem to provide much
better support for the naturalist view. After all, none of these four ways of
going wrong seem to have required engagement in ‘sympathetic regression’
from the human experience of disease. And it just seems plain absurd to
insist on doing so in some of these examples.
3.2 What about Humans?
The second step in their argument then is to convince the reader that their
concept of biological normativity easily latches onto humans, as is nicely il-
lustrated by the following quote: “[u]nsurprisingly, each of these can occur in
human beings” (2017, p. 457). The first way is the most obvious: mechanism
failure is one of the main concerns in medical science and the very basis for
Wakefield’s (1992) harmful dysfunction account. As an example of an ab-
Normal environment, Matthewson and Griffiths (2017) list carbon monoxide
poisoning. In this example, all the mechanisms in the human body could be
perfectly working as selected for, but none have been adapted for this environ-
ment. To illustrate normal but inhospitable environments, they suggest the
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well-documented case of negative embryo development when food is scarce, a
situation that was hardly abNormal in our evolutionary past. This example is
furthermore, tied to the fourth case. Citing the predictive adaptive response
hypothesis10 Matthewson and Griffiths argue that “if it ‘appears’ to a hu-
man fetus that its mother is not receiving adequate nutrition, its metabolism
develops to be suited for future nutritional hardship” (2017, p. 457). The
famous famine in the Netherlands from 1944-1945 illustrates the point, with
a significant proportion of children conceived during this time “develop[ing]
obesity, diabetes, and cardiovascular disease” (p. 457). Though this predic-
tive adaptive response or development switch may have evolved to maximize
expected fitness, here it failed to maximize realized fitness, hence a heuristic
failure. Something has gone wrong for these children from a purely biological
point of view.
These normative judgements are interesting and common in biology.
Matthewson and Griffiths (2017) do not intend their list to be exhaustive,
nor exclusive; there might be other ways in which things could go wrong for an
organism. However, they have identified two sources of normativity on which
these judgements rest. As briefly alluded to, the first source of biological
normativity is evolutionary history. As they explain, “[n]atural selection has
designed many biological traits to perform certain tasks in certain settings”
(p. 459), which opens up two ways something can go wrong for an organism,
either with the mechanism or an abNormal environment. Both of these are
backward-looking. However, as they point out, there are two more ways
of going wrong tied to evolutionary success that can be addressed without
importing normative claims from outside of biology. This “forward-looking
criterion of success—representation in future” accounts for the fact that the
environment is often hostile and that organisms can have bad luck even when
their development heuristic responded correctly to the available information
(p. 459).
Granting that their analysis of biological normativity is closely related
to the two views of functions espoused in Boorse and Wakefield respectively,
they argue that their analysis shows that these options should not be seen
as exclusive. Both sources of normativity have their origin in biology, so
they view it as a pointless dispute to push one over the other. In fact, they
argue that criticism against the restrictiveness of each may be overcome by
recognizing such a broader view of biological normativity.
10See Low et al. (2012); Gluckman et al. (2005).
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Interestingly their argument parallels a now-popular view in philosophy
of biology: i.e. function pluralism.11 According to Justin Garson (2018),
who recently wrote an excellent article on the nature of function pluralism,
different concepts of function are not only legitimate across sub-disciplines in
biology but also within them, a position that may be able to lay an old dispute
in the philosophy of medicine to rest. Indeed, this pluralistic view leads
Matthewson and Griffiths to endorse a more permissive necessary condition
for their form of naturalism than either Boorse or Wakefield, and one that is
ultimately intended as a rejection of Canguilhem:
[W]e claim that the necessary biological criterion for pathology is
that the phenotype must constitute a failure of biological norma-
tivity, where this is understood as either a failure to discharge a
selected effect or a lowering of fitness (or both).
– Matthewson and Griffiths (2017, p. 460)
Their conclusion is simple: “disease cannot be solely a matter of social con-
vention” (2017, p. 464). As this point would perhaps be embraced by the
majority of normativists, this conclusion may appear fairly weak. One may
be tempted to think that I have given their account too much attention
(or praise for that matter). However, I deem it necessary to analyse their
account in its entirety in order to discharge them from the premature conclu-
sion others might draw: that they provide a mere combination of Boorsian
and Wakefield-type accounts of health and disease. Most of the responses to
naturalist accounts of health and disease have focused on counter-examples,
arguing that these naturalist conditions are too restrictive and need to be
amended. Matthewson and Griffiths do not face this problem; in fact, they
face the opposite problem. Their condition might be considered so permissive
that one may need further social constraints and begin to question whether
their biological criterion has any use at all.
They anticipate this concern and address the issue as follows. First,
they note that some limit must be put on the reduction of fitness in order
to count as pathological. Though something may have gone wrong for an
organism, e.g. being born into a slightly colder climate than the organism has
been selected for, this need not constitute disease. Otherwise, any organism
11Which is perhaps unsurprising given Griffiths’ previous endorsement of the view (1993,
p. 410), in addition to the fact that two of Matthewson’s supervisors have argued for it
(Godfrey-Smith 1993, p. 200; Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008, p. 114).
14
would count as diseased if they are consuming slightly less nutrition than
usual. Proponents of fitness-based disease accounts have come up with a
variety of solutions to the problem (see Boorse 1977; Hausman 2012; Garson
and Piccinini 2014). Matthewson and Griffiths do not commit themselves to
any particular cut-off point but merely suggest that one may adapt Boorse’s
statistical outlier solution that is already common and well-respected in the
medical literature.
Furthermore, they highlight that biology simply does not have sharp
boundaries. The search for essential features in the biological world will al-
ways be plagued by counterexamples. Vagueness is an inherent feature of
biological characterization and should, therefore, be recognized in the philos-
ophy of medicine “even if that entails some revision of the concept” (2017,
462). Criticism of these biological cut-off points for being too vague may be
unfounded and demand something that biological criteria cannot possibly de-
liver. Before we use the idea of biological normativity to breathe new air into
naturalist approaches in the philosophy of medicine, let us first respond to
a number of actual and possible criticisms against Matthewson and Griffiths
(2017).
4 Biological Normativity Defended
The BN account faces several objections, many of which have been raised
by Schwartz (2007b). In the following, I address these worries and defend
the BN account against further potential criticisms. First of all, it seems
somewhat unclear what Matthewson and Griffiths mean when they say they
are providing a naturalist account. At the beginning of their paper, they
state the central question in philosophy of medicine to be whether disease
can “be analyzed solely in terms of human biology, solely in terms of values
and social practices, or only with some mixture of the two?” (2017, p. 447).
On the one hand, they are claiming that their account can help to distinguish
pathological cases in plants and animals without any value-judgements, on
the other hand, they suggest that they are open for the inclusion of value-
judgements, especially in the case of human pathology. It seems that they
are deliberately open to make their case as strong as possible, a move that
may be well-justified due to the scope of their paper.
After all, if values do play a role in shaping pathology judgements,
normativists might be the ones best equipped to deal with this part of the
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concept. If both parts are complex and require substantial further work, it
is unlikely that a single paper can accommodate both, such as Wakefield
(1992) attempted with his HD account. Matthewson and Griffiths, however,
intend to keep the label naturalist, seemingly redefining it on the basis of
whether biological facts are a necessary component of an acceptable account
of health and disease (see also Griffiths and Matthewson 2018, 2020). Hence, I
propose that rather than a sharp dividing line between two competing camps,
a division of labour between naturalists and normativists is the best method
for progressing the debate. According to this vision, naturalists would work
on the objective biological failures underlying disease, while normativists or
social constructivists would work on the question of how values and social
facts refine the concept .
Let us turn now to Schwartz’s (2017) criticism of the BN account. First
of all, I should mention that Schwartz’s opposition towards Matthewsons and
Griffiths’ account is somewhat surprising, given that in an earlier paper he
criticized the idea that there is an underlying definition of disease shared
across the biomedical sciences (see Schwartz 2007a). By providing a more
pluralist view of how things can go wrong in the biological world, Matthew-
son and Griffith’s may very well be seen as dealing with this criticism. It is
not that health and disease rest on a single conception of dysfunction but
multiple ones. In fact, as noted earlier, they are motivated by the apparent
lack of unity between normativist proposals and the way the term ‘pathol-
ogy’ is used within the biological sciences. So it appears odd that Schwartz
simultaneously maintains that we cannot provide a single definition, but also
shouldn’t turn towards a more pluralistic understanding of biological norma-
tivity.
When Schwartz (Schwartz 2007a) argued that different accounts of
disease might be reasonable in different areas of medicine, he is taking a
stance that appears to be in conflict with his criticism of the BN account.
Nevertheless, Schwartz could respond in several ways. First of all, Schwartz
may deny that the BN account is actually a unified one, rather than a mere
list of four different ways something can go wrong for an organism. However,
this response will not work if all of the different ways are applicable across
different domains in the biomedical sciences and Matthewson and Griffiths
have provided sufficient evidence that they do.12
12A naturalist may very well see these different ways of going wrong as useful perspec-
tives or models of a single phenomena in nature, without having to give up on the reality
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Nevertheless, Schwartz could respond to this by pointing to his ad-
ditional criticism that Matthewson and Griffiths themselves do grant that
though something may have gone wrong for an organism from a biological
point of view, this failure in biological normativity need not count as a dis-
ease. He identifies the problem to be this: rather than something going wrong
for an organism, something has to be wrong with an organism. Therefore, he
is reluctant to accept anything but the first way of going wrong as a neces-
sary condition for disease, i.e. mechanism failure. Further, Schwartz argues
that Matthewson and Griffiths do not provide sufficient justification for their
account, as the counterexamples raised against the BST and HD accounts
have already been addressed by both of the authors (see Boorse 1997, 2014;
Wakefield 2007), either by locating the dysfunction elsewhere or biting the
bullet.
Nevertheless, there is something spurious about these responses. After
all, critics of both accounts have been left far from convinced by Boorse’s
and Wakefield’s replies. In fact, Schwartz even suggests that “[p]erhaps truly
universal epidemics that last for many generations, if they ever occur, should
be classified as new norms of health rather than as disease” (2017, pp. 493-
494). This, however, is very clearly unintuitive and sells naturalism short. As
Matthewson and Griffiths point out, parasites and hosts just like predators
and prey “produce distinctive evolutionary dynamics” (2017, p. 449) that
play a central role in biology. A naturalist account of health and disease that
discounts this fact is not only unappealing in an intuitive sense but unable
to capture a paradigmatic instance of disease and also unable to make sense
of much research on pathology within biology. The attempt to combine both
views to accommodate each other’s problems is then seemingly a natural
move.
Last but not least, Schwartz suggests an understanding of Matthewson
and Griffiths’ proposal of four distinct senses in which a biologist speak of
something ‘going wrong’ for some organism” as mere “ways of thinking or
speaking, ones that may be vague or metaphoric rather than literal or scien-
tific” (2017, 494). It is here that Schwartz is making a grave mistake. Just
because scientists talk about a problem in a vague or metaphorical sense does
not mean it is not scientific. In fact, one may even argue that the successful
use of such language within science qualifies it as being scientific. This is
of phenomena, in which case pluralism should face even less resistance (Veit and Browning
2020; Veit 2019b,c, 2020, forthcomingb).
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in line with the naturalism Quine supports: “it is within science itself, and
not in some prior philosophy, that reality is to be identified and described”
(Quine and Quine (1981), p. 21). Thus, when Schwartz says that it is “really
adopting a perspective rather than making an objective claim” (p. 494), it
is not at all clear what he means by objective. Biological Normativity is
value-free in the sense that biological normativity merely emerges from the
biological facts. It suggests that the apparent value-ladenness of terms such
as health and disease may have a scientific basis, rather than (or at least
not only) one based on social facts or moral views. It suggests four dis-
tinct ways in which an organism may enter a pathological state, evaluative
judgements that can be made independently of external sources. This relates
to Matthewson and Griffiths’ (2017) response to the line-drawing problem
for diseases. They point out that biology is not as stringent as physics and
chemistry. There are no laws or essential properties in any strict sense. The
boundaries of concepts are vague and necessarily so. Now, Schwartz may re-
sort to the position that biology is not really an objective science, a position
that was endorsed by the earlier positivists and is perhaps still popular in
some scientific circles, but this is not a position popular among philosophers
of science today. A naturalist account of health and disease is then neces-
sarily vague - something that can’t and shouldn’t be used as an argument
against it. If nature doesn’t lend itself to sharp distinctions than so much
worse for any non-naturalist account that purports to show that there are.
Having dealt with Schwartz’s and further potential criticisms of BN, we can
now turn our attention to the naturalism vs normativism debate to conclude
the discussion.
5 Naturalism Strikes Back
In her appeal to move beyond the strict opposition between naturalism and
normativism, Kingma suggests that one way in which a stark distinction
might be misleading are disputes over apparent facts that turn out to really
be about different values, i.e. values “which are agreed are disguised as facts”
(2017, p. 16). She mentions meta-ethics as an example and raises the concern
that the literature on health and disease has paid insufficient attention to it.
Far from accepting this suggestion, I suggest that naturalists could
simply appeal to the inverse. What seem to be value judgements about the
desirableness of certain states are really disputes over biological facts. If the
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BN account can explain why health and disease ‘seem’ to be value-laden by
introducing an account of biological normativity, naturalist approaches to
health and disease may experience a revival in the field. Nevertheless, both
of these options, whether ours or Kingma’s, bridge the traditional distinction
between naturalism and normativism. As these two inverse options for bridg-
ing the naturalism and normativism divide show, it might be premature to
abolish the distinction between the two or rather the sorting into two distinct
camps. As these two extreme cases demonstrate, there is a straightforward
sense in which an account is naturalist rather than normativist or vice-versa.
Matthewson and Griffiths (2017) do allow for the possibility that social
facts and values may play a role in determining whether a state counts as
pathological or diseased, however, it is the biological facts that have primacy
since they determine whether something has gone wrong biologically.13 Under
the traditional definition of naturalism in the debate, as value-freedom, this
would then qualify as a normativist account. Such a dividing line may not be
useful and potentially damaging. Normativists may very well recognize that
something has gone wrong biologically when a disease is present, but conclude
that the social facts and values are primary when it comes to determining
whether a state would count as pathological. If the distinction between
naturalism and normativism can be upheld in a revised form, then it is
arguably something like this Matthewson and Griffiths (2017) would like to
endorse. One should thus resist the temptation to re-introduce the term
‘hybrid’ for the positions that combine ‘facts’ and ‘values’ since this will in
one form or another be true of any position in the conceptual space. And yet,
we would be no closer to determining which facts and values matter and to
which extent they do so - the conflict between naturalists and normativists
remains - albeit in an, I think, more productive and less hostile fashion.
Viewing this dispute as a matter of emphasis would provide a more
useful distinction between naturalism and normativism on health and dis-
ease and would allow a more meaningful exchange between the two camps,
both recognizing that the other side is working on a different component of
the problem, judged to be more important. Such an attitude would be sim-
ilar to meaningful intra-disciplinary exchanges within sciences, such as the
exchanges between geneticists and developmental biologists. Drawing hard
13In the case of mental disorders such autism we may be more reluctant to admit a
naturalist interpretation though there is likewise room for both facts and values to play a
role in classification (Chapman 2020; Chapman and Veit forthcoming, 2020).
19
lines in the sand is unlikely to be the most reasonable approach for progress.
Kingma drew similar conclusions, suggesting that the “way forward is almost
certainly not to polarize further by emphasizing the contrast between natu-
ralism and normativism, but to adopt a more nuanced perspective” (2017,
p. 16). Hence, I propose a division of labour between naturalists and nor-
mativists within the concept of health and disease. The distinction between
naturalism and normativism would then merely boil down to a different em-
phasis in the importance of both components, a distinction that will serve
much more productive than any strict dividing line could ever prove to be.
To conclude, Biological Normativity in the sense of Matthewson and
Griffiths (2017), rather than Canguilhem (1991), is a genuinely novel idea
with important roots in the work of Ruth Millikan (1984) and Karen Ne-
ander (1983). As a naturalist project it has the advantage of solving the
respective problems of both Boorse’s BST account and Wakefield’s HD ac-
count. The real strength of this contribution to the field of philosophy of
medicine, however, lies elsewhere. In their (perhaps somewhat uncharitable)
characterization of normativism, Matthewson and Griffiths (2017) themselves
have not seen the full potential of their account. Rather than providing a
mere alternative to other dysfunction-requiring accounts of health and dis-
ease, they may have offered a novel approach to bridge the very gap between
normativism and naturalism. I suggested to draw a new distinction between
normativists and naturalists using the concept of BN, a distinction that is
grounded in a division of labour on the various components that make up
disease. Health and disease are complex phenomena, with multiple compo-
nents such as biological facts, values, and social facts. It is unlikely that any
single author could hope to solve this debate. However, in their co-authored
paper, Matthewson and Griffiths may have led the groundwork for such col-
laborative work to commence. The idea of objective biological normativity
instantiated by at least four ways something can go wrong for an organism
has the potential to revolutionize the debate. Naturalism has an important
role to play after all.
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